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The Warshawsky Law Firm Blog

Monday, September 21, 2015

A Tale Of Two Cases: Why Some Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Win And Others Lose

At The Warshawsky Law Firm, we handle a wide variety of employment discrimination cases.  When first meeting a prospective client, perhaps our most important task is evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of a potential lawsuit.  Indeed, we usually are asked by the client whether he/she "has a case" and "what are the chances of winning."  This is a complicated question that can be difficult to answer based on the limited information and documentation that the client usually has in his/her possession.  Often times the full picture of an employment situation does not emerge until after the lawsuit has been filed and the parties engage in discovery.

The central question in every discrimination case is whether the plaintiff can prove that the employer was motivated by unlawful discriminatory bias, hostility, or animosity.  For example, in a wrongful termination case, was the plaintiff fired because of his/her race or age or religion, etc.?  While the plaintiff may "believe" that he/she was discriminated against by the employer, this is not good enough in court.  To be able to win a lawsuit in court, the plaintiff must have objective evidence that shows that the employer acted from a discriminatory motive.

What kind of evidence?  While each case is different and various factual circumstances can raise an inference of unlawful discrimination, the most common types of evidence that courts look for are discriminatory comments and differential treatment of similarly situated employees.

Discriminatory comments are just that -- spoken or written comments that demonstrate discriminatory animus.  For example, derogatory comments about a person's race or sex or disability, etc.  Comment evidence is the most important type of evidence in an employment discrimination case.   

Differential treatment of similarly situated employees means, for example, that the employer treats black and white employees differently in the same context (for example, when being disciplined for alleged infractions of workplace rules).  This is the second most important type of evidence -- showing that employees are treated differently for no reason other than their race, sex, disability, etc.

Two recent decisions by U.S. District Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York (a highly respected jurist) illustrate these basic principles. 

The first case is Charles Krugler v. MTA New York City Transit Authority, et al., Case No. 12-CV-2900.  The second case is Russell Herling v. New York City Department of Education, et al., Case No. 13-CV-5287. 

In the Krugler case, the plaintiff was a 57-year old transit employee who alleged that his employer had discriminated against him on the basis of age by rejecting him for 18 promotions that he had applied for between 2001 and 2011.

In a decision issued on September 10, 2015, Judge Gleeson granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit.  Why?  Because the plaintiff did not have any evidence, other than his own opinion, that he had been discriminated against based on his age.  There were no discriminatory comments, and the evidence showed that older employees had been interviewed for and in some cases selected for the positions in question -- as Judge Gleeson explained, "[t]his is persuasive evidence that the defendants did not discriminate against Krugler based on his age."  Moreover, "Krugler was eventually promoted to the position of AGS, one of the positions he claims he was passed over for because of his age."  Based on these facts, Judge Gleeson concluded "as a matter of law" that "age discrimination played no role in the failure to promote Krugler."

In the Herling case, the plaintiff was a white Jewish physical education teacher at a public high school in Brooklyn who alleged that his employer had discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion by disciplining him for workplace infractions, giving him an unsatisfactory rating, and denying him opportunities for additional pay.

In a decision also issued on September 10, 2015, Judge Gleeson denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and allowed the plaintiff's case to proceed to trial.  Why?  Unlike the plaintiff in the Krugler case, the plaintiff in the Herling case offered objective evidence of his supervisor's discriminatory animus.  This evidence included several discriminatory comments and specific examples of non-white and non-Jewish teachers receiving preferential treatment.  For example, the plaintiff showed that black employees who committed the same alleged rules infractions (e.g., being late to work, not submitting student grades properly) were not disciplined for the same or worse conduct for which he was disciplined.  Judge Gleeson agreed with the plaintiff that this evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.  Although the defendants offered various non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's workplace treatment, Judge Gleeson ruled that the plaintiff's evidence was strong enough to require a jury to decide whether or not he had been discriminated against.

The outcomes in these two cases highlight the crucial importance in an employment discrimination case for the plaintiff to present objective evidence -- usually in the form of discriminatory comments and/or differential treatment of similarly situated employees -- that the employer was motivated by discriminatory animus.  Without such evidence, it is very difficult for a plaintiff to persuade a court to allow the case to go to trial.

 

If you or someone you know has been the victim of workplace discrimination, please contact The Warshawsky Law Firm today.





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